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Trustworthy environment perception is the funda-
mental basis for the safe deployment of automated
agents such as self-driving vehicles or intelligent robots.
The problem remains that such trust is notoriously dif-
ficult to guarantee in the presence of systematic faults,
e.g. non-traceable errors caused by machine learning
functions. One way to tackle this issue without making
rather specific assumptions about the perception pro-
cess is plausibility checking. Similar to the reasoning
of human intuition, the final outcome of a complex
black-box procedure is verified against given expecta-
tions of an object’s behavior. In this article, we apply
and evaluate collaborative, sensor-generic plausibility
checking as a mean to detect empirical perception faults
from their statistical fingerprints. Our real use case is
next-generation automated driving that uses a roadside
sensor infrastructure for perception augmentation, rep-
resented here by test scenarios at a German highway
and a city intersection. The plausibilization analysis is
integrated naturally in the object fusion process, and
helps to diagnose known and possibly yet unknown
faults in distributed sensing systems.
Index Terms—Intelligent transportation systems,
Plausibility checks, Automated driving, Smart infras-
tructure, Dependability, Sensor data fusion
I. Introduction
The verification of a complex environment model with-
out explicit knowledge of – or access to – the full processing
pipeline is one of the key challenges of modern perception
systems. Causes for incorrect observations can involve
electronic system malfunctions of sensors or unintended
system behavior, i.e. misperception in the absence of
malfunctions such as misuse or incomplete information [1].
Notably, object detection further relies more and more on
machine learning techniques such as deep neural networks,
which are known to be sensitive to particular faults that
defy a classical safety assurance (e.g. erroneous training
data, ontology gaps, adversarial noise, etc.) [2]. We here
refer to a wider class of root causes for the incorrect
environment perception of an intelligent sensing device
as perception faults. The detection and evaluation of such
perception faults is the prerequisite for a safety analysis
concerning the user of the environment model, e.g. an
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automated vehicle (AV), as regulated by standardization
bodies such as the ISO 26262 [3] or ISO/PAS 21448
(SOTIF) [4].
Among quantitative model-based verification
approaches [5], [6], we see a characteristic trade-off
between the complexity of the verification process and the
coverage of potential faults: Traditional fault diagnosis
techniques, based e.g. on a direct hardware or software
redundancy, provide variable sets of high completeness,
leading to a potentially high fault coverage. However,
a replication of components is neither cost-efficient
nor feasible in many scenarios. In contrast to that,
analytical redundancies inferred from known functional
dependencies on the input variables, or a priori rules,
allow to check output variables with greatly reduced
complexity. For that reason, plausibility checks that
verify complex environment variables against a range
of expected outcomes are promising candidates for the
verification of black-box perception systems [2]. On the
other hand, functional relationships are often unknown
or ambiguous, resulting in a lack of diagnostic residuals
which can diminish the fault coverage. It is therefore of
great interest to numerous safety-critical applications if
and how such an approach is able to diagnose realistic
perception faults.
In this article, we investigate the suitability of plausi-
bility checking for the evaluation of perception faults in
the context of a distributed sensor network (DSN) for
collaborative environment perception. Our use case is a
roadside sensor network that supports automated vehicles
with complementary high-quality data [8], a concept also
known as smart infrastructure, that represents one of the
driving forces in the fast-growing market of intelligent
transportation systems and smart cities [9]. Verification
methods as the one studied in this article allow to quantify
trust in the integrity of the perception data, and will be
required to achieve certifiably safe infrastructure systems
in the future (see e.g. [10]).
DSNs typically adopt a decentralized tracking architec-
ture, where each sensing device performs a series of pro-
cessing steps and eventually provides with lists of tracked
objects. The data from multiple sensors are then combined
in a central node in the course of high-level sensor data fu-
sion (SDF), or object fusion. Starting from the architecture
of [11] and the track-to-track (T2T) fusion implementation
of [12], we here present a plausibility checking framework
that integrates naturally into the object fusion process.
Uncertainties are handled within the Dempster-Shafer
(DS) theory of evidence [13], [14]. Besides an instantaneous
plausibility assessment, we provide with statistical metrics
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2Figure 1: An example experiment performed in the KoRA9 project, see also [7]. (Left) Object tracks accumulated over time at
a highway test segment. Plausibilization can be applied to identify false positive tracks, and reveal inconsistencies in regions of
sensor overlaps. (Right) One elementary perception fault is the misorientation of individual sensors at the roadside.
Class Local effect (Error) Potential fault cause
1 Sensor reports readings
with incorrect angles
•Misoriented sensor pose (e.g. poor calibration, air blasts of passing vehicles,
accidents, malicious intervention)
• Incorrect signal processing
2 Sensor has a higher
false positive rate than
expected
• Defect component causing increased thermal noise
• Incorrect parametrization of algorithmic component (e.g. tracking or de-
tection threshold)
• Incorrect signal processing (e.g. ground plane filter, side lobe artefacts)
• (Local) spoofing
• Increased signal multipath propagation (e.g. highly reflecting object in sensor field
of view)
3 Sensor has a higher
false negative rate than
expected
• Sensor surface polluted
• Incorrect parametrization of algorithmic component
• Incorrect signal processing
Table I: Typical safety-critical perception errors and faults, as identified from real smart infrastructure experiments. Faults
with similar local effects in the system are combined to fault classes. The selected highlighted faults are injected in simulation
in Sec. V to test plausibility-based fault evaluation.
in order to identify systematical faults. While additional
customized plausibility checks can be readily incorporated
due to the modular structure of the framework, we here
focus on sensor-generic checks that are not limited to a
specific modality of the underlying sensor network (most
commonly camera, Radar, Lidar), in order to keep the
methodology widely applicable.
We test our plausibility-based fault diagnosis in sim-
ulation, using the injection of typical perception faults
as identified from real-world infrastructure experiments.
In particular, we use insights from the German publicly
funded projects KoRA9 [15] and P++ [16]. In KoRA9,
environment perception with a Radar-only roadside sensor
network is studied at a German highway, see also Fig. 1.
The P++ project on the other hand is set up to monitor a
cohesive test area of highway, rural, and urban roads with
a variety of sensor modalities including camera and Radar.
The Tab. I gives examples of empirical, potentially safety-
critical faults that challenge roadside perception systems
due to their systematic, erratic, and unsignaled nature.
Selected fault instances that are representative of broader
classes with similar local effects will be used in this article
to identify characteristic signatures.
In summary, the novel contribution of our work is
twofold:
• While in [11] separate modules for T2T and existence
fusion are envisioned, we here describe a more efficient
combined approach, meaning that plausibility checks
and existence estimation are naturally integrated into
the object fusion process. We further introduce ad-
ditional checks that correlate the track status of an
object with other observed attributes. This allows for
a more differentiated and realistic situational assess-
ment.
• We demonstrate that plausibility-based metrics rep-
resent a valid strategy to detect realistic perception
in the given setup. The signatures of three empirical
faults are studied in simulation, and characteristic
fingerprints are identified. We provide an interpreta-
tion of the plausibility metrics with respect to the
underlying source of implausibility.
The article is structured as follows: In Sec. II we review
related literature, before we present our model in Sec. III,
including the process integration and the various plausi-
bility checks. Next, Sec. IV describes the method for the
detection of perception faults. The respective plausibility
signatures are analyzed in Sec. V for two different scenar-
ios, before we conclude in Sec. VI.
II. Related work
First, it is key to note the difference between mea-
surement uncertainty, plausibility, and risk. The former
refers to the statistical inaccuracy of a sensor observation,
and its propagation throughout the system. Plausibility
represents a notion of trust in a hypothesis (e.g. "object
3exists"), that is established by checking a piece of infor-
mation against expectations based by a priori knowledge
or consistency with other sources. As given in Sec. III, the
plausibility of an existence hypothesis can be conveniently
mapped onto a probability of existence measure. Risk on
the other hand refers to an event, which can occur with
a certain likelihood and a given impact on a user. Proba-
bilities of existence and uncertainties are valuable inputs
to a risk analysis, but can not provide with any context
or user impact. In this article, we are not concerned with
the explicit evaluation of measurement uncertainty or risk,
but with plausibilization.
Different hierarchies of plausibility checking are to be
distinguished, the authors of [17] define for example three
categories of increasing complexity: i) Single signal mon-
itoring, ii) redundancy-based checking, and iii) model-
based checking. Interesting examples for the latter cate-
gory are e.g. the plausibilization of trajectory curvature
against possible lateral acceleration [18], or unphysical
overlaps of object shapes [19]. Among the established
mathematical methods to quantify confidence, in partic-
ular Bayesian belief networks and the DS theory have
proven to be appropriate tools [20].
In the domain of safety for automated driving, plau-
sibility checking methods have been applied to verify the
environment perception of (overlapping) in-vehicle sensors
– including camera, Lidar, and Radar modalities – and
to infer a probability of existence metric [11], [21], [22].
Most of the applied checks there are single-signal and
redundancy checks. This assessment can take place at
different stages of the SDF, and the checks take differ-
ent forms depending on the available features. High-level
object fusion architectures with DS plausibilization have
for example been studied in [11], [21]. Here, the position
of an object is for example checked against the position of
other objects to identify implausible occlusions, and a non-
uniform belief is assigned across a sensor’s field of view
(FoV). Another body of literature harnesses plausibility
checking to address secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
communication, see e.g. [19], [23], [24]. Information that
is transmitted to a vehicle from external sources, such
as the infrastructure or other vehicles, is plausibilized to
detect misbehavior or spoofing. A basis for verification
are the parameters contained e.g. in the format of a
basic safety message (BSM), including position, speed,
acceleration or object dimensions [18], but also the sensing
and communication range.
III. Model
A. Object representation
The Fig. 2 gives a schematic overview of a high-level
fusion system. Objects tracked by the individual sensors
are passed to a central fusion module. In the highlighted
infrastructure use case, this component runs for example
on an edge cloud server at the roadside. We here focus on
an integrated model of object fusion and plausibilization
as the core functionality of this module.
Let us define a tracked object reported by an individual
sensor as a structured list O, while O is the local object
list, i.e. the set of all individually registered objects at a
common time step,
O = (i, n, t,x,P ,d, trstatus, . . .) ≡ Oin(t), (1)
O(t) = {{Oin(t)|n = 1, 2, . . .}|i = 1, 2, . . .}. (2)
The minimal required object attributes in our model are: i
sensor index, n track identifier (ID), t time stamp, x object
state, P state covariance matrix, d object dimensions, and
trstatus tracking status information. Any object can be
uniquely identified by (i, n, t). For notational ease, we only
give selected attributes if clear from the context (e.g. Oi
refers to a given object reported by a sensor i, xOi ≡ xi,
etc.). We specify
x = (x, y, z, vx, vy, vz)′,
d = (L,W,H, h),
trstatus = (sc, cnf, cst, . . .) .
(3)
Object position and velocity are represented by x, y, z
and vx, vy, vz, respectively. The dimension entails length
(L), width (W ), height (H), and heading (h) of the
perceived object. In our simulation, we adopt a sequential
multi-object tracking (MOT) scheme – different implemen-
tations are possible and do not affect the general model
– where the track score sc is a log-likelihood ratio [25]
that increases (decreases) with each incoming (missing)
update. The binary value cnf indicates whether the object
track is a confirmed (cnf = 1), or a tentative (cnf = 0)
track. Furthermore, the binary cst incorporates informa-
tion about the coasting status, i.e. whether the object
track is updated at the current time step (cst = 0) or
not (cst = 1).
Next, a system object O˜ is defined to be a global tracked
object, that can be observed by multiple sensors at the
same time, and therefore can have multiple varying local
representations. Similar to Eq. 2 we define the system
object list O˜ at a common time t,
O˜ = (n′, t,x,P ,d, trstatus, p∃, s∃, . . .) ≡ O˜n′(t), (4)
O˜(t) = {O˜n′(t)|n′ = 1, 2, . . .}. (5)
Here, p∃, s∃ are the respective probability existence and
existence uncertainty metrics derived in Sec. III-D, using
the concepts of belief and plausibility. The goal of the
object fusion with integrated plausibility checking is the
transformation O(t) −→ O˜(t), under consideration of tem-
poral continuity. In the process, the metrics p∃ and s∃ are
assigned to give a quantifiable estimate for trust in the
observation.
B. Fusion module
The integral part of this process is track-to-track fusion
[25], which combines the dynamic state variables of multi-
ple tracks. Furthermore, object fusion merges features like
dimensions, headings etc. We encounter the following steps
(see Fig. 2):
• Object association Synchronous and confirmed lo-
cal representations in O are grouped to track clusters,
[O(t)]clustered. We adopt the T2T distance calculation
and the global nearest neighbor (GNN) association of
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Figure 2: (Left) System sketch of the decentralized tracking architecture for collaborative perception. (Right) Schematic of the
fusion module, performing combined object fusion and plausibilization.
[12], which can include the history of local represen-
tations for better association robustness.
• Merging All local object representations within one
cluster are merged to a single system object [12]. The
result of this fusion process is a system object list[O˜(t)]inst (for instantaneous), with arbitrary IDs.
• Association across framesWe associate the unique
object labels from the previous and the current
time frames via another GNN association, so that
persistent objects keep the same unique ID in the
matched list
[O˜(t)]matched. Dimensions and existence
estimations can be averaged across recent frames for
improved robustness.
Our model now integrates various plausibility checks in
the object fusion process to evaluate the quality of the
sensor data. Extending the paradigm of [17], we have three
different types of checks, see Fig. 2 and Sec. III-C - III-E:
• Single-sensor checks are based on the attributes
of local representations from a single sensor and
result in the basic belief assignment of the DS frame-
work. An attribute is here checked against predefined
thresholds (signal-based) or known relations to other
attributes (model-based).
• Redundancy checks compare local object repre-
sentations from different sensors that refer to the
same system object, as identified by object associa-
tion. Such redundancy checks are applied after the
clustering, and before the merging step. Here, they are
represented by the DS combination, together with the
registration of misses and unexpected observations.
• Collaborative model-based checks aim to verify
the final outcome of the fusion process against prede-
fined rules about the expected behavior of system ob-
jects. This additional processing step transforms the
output of the frame-association process
[O˜(t)]matched
into the desired output O˜(t). Such checks may be
based on instantaneous interrelations among merged
object attributes, or on the evolution of merged at-
tributes over time. In this work, we present two pos-
sible checks that can be used to tackle false positives
or spoofed detections (see Sec. III-E). Various further
checks of increasing complexity can be envisioned at
this point, including e.g. traffic-rule-compliant trajec-
tory checking, or self-learned motion patterns.
The process diagram of Fig. 2 further illustrates which
information beyond the sensor object data is required to
perform the plausibility checks described in our model.
Single-sensor (and partially the redundancy) checks build
upon the knowledge of sensor metadata such as the sensor
field of view and mounting locations, or the expected road
boundaries of a digital map. Physical limits of variables
and predefined rules help to establish additional plausibil-
ity for all three types of checks.
C. Single-sensor checks
Compared to a Bayesian-based object existence estima-
tion, the well-studied Dempster Shafer theory of evidence
[13], [14], [26] postulates an extended probability space of
ΘDS = {∅,∃,@, {∃,@}}, where ∅ is the null set, ∃ and
@ are the propositions that a given object exists or does
not exist, respectively, and the element {∃,@} represents
the possibility that the existence of the object is unknown.
Basic belief assignments (BBA) give rise to belief masses
that indicate the degree of belief in a proposition according
to a given sensor. Explicitly, mi(XO˜) denotes the belief
mass for the proposition X ∈ ΘDS of O˜ based on the local
observation Oi of sensor i.
The following sensor-generic plausibility checks define
our BBA,
mi(∃O˜) = pitrust pFoV(Oi) pocc(Oi)
× pex(Oi) pdm(Oi) pval(Oi),
mi(@O˜) = pitrust pFoV(Oi) pocc(Oi)
× [1− pex(Oi) pdm(Oi) pval(Oi)] ,
mi({∃,@}O˜) = 1− [mi(∃) +mi(@)] .
(6)
Note that despite the formal equivalence to some of
the models of [21], [22], [27], [28], the BBA factors in
Eq. 6 take a different form due to the fact that we
study tracked objects instead of detections, which leads
to important additional interrelations of the attributes of
Oi. The plausibility factors p can be grouped into two
categories: A reduced value of ptrust, pFoV, pocc will support
ignorance of the system object, while a low weight on
pex, pdm, pval favors the proposition of non-existence. The
5individual factors defining the BBA are explained in more
detail in the following.
First, pitrust is an object-independent trust factor for the
sensor i, which can be interpreted as its typical object
detection capability [22].
The factor pFoV checks whether the reported object
is in the three-dimensional FoV, here defined as fovi =
(ri, ωi, ψi), where r is the range, ω and ψ the horizontal
and vertical view angle, respectively. Given that at least
one point across the body of an extended object (here we
check the eight corners of the bounding box, object center,
and two additional points in the middle front and rear of
the bounding box) is found to be within the expected FoV,
we denote (xi,di) ∈ fov. Otherwise, a distance metric
D is applied to measure the closest distance from the
object center xi to the FoV. For example, D(xi, ri) is the
difference of the radial distance of xi and the sensor range,
and analogous for ω, ψ. We then define
pFoV(Oi) =
{
1 if (xi,di) ∈ fovi,
e−
∑3
n=1
D(xi,fovin)/(fov
i
n/2) otherwise.
(7)
This choice of weighting is motivated by two additional
considerations: i) Tracked objects can leave the FoV while
coasting, in which case it is legitimate to have pFoV >
0; ii) Tracks far away from the original FoV should be
suppressed, whether coasting or not (otherwise unrealistic,
e.g. spoofed tracks that pop up at an arbitrary remote
location and start coasting would be supported).
Next, pocc verifies if an object is rightfully observable in
relation to other objects perceived by the same sensor. If
at least one of the checked surface points of Oi is in the line
of sight of sensor i, given all other confirmed observations
of i, we denote (xi,di) ∈ LoSi({Oi}). If that this is not
the case, and at the same time the track is not coasting,
the object is occluded and the belief in this observation is
forfeited. A track that is coasting in the shadow of another
object will not be affected.
pocc(Oi) =
{
0 if (xi,di) /∈ LoSi({Oi}) ∧ csti = 0,
1 otherwise.
(8)
Furthermore, pex(Oi) is the existence probability of the
object as estimated by sensor i. Here, we infer pex directly
from the track score [25], [29],
pex(Oi) = 1/
(
1 + e−α score
i+β
)
, (9)
where α and β are tunable coefficients to control the slope
of the sigmoid function. We here chose α and β such that
a newly initialized, tentative track starts with pex = 0.9,
and increases to pex = 0.99 if the score reaches the confir-
mation threshold. A detection missed by sensor i will be
handled as pex(Oi) = 0, leading with Eq. 6 to mi(∃O˜) = 0,
mi(@O˜) = pitrust, and mi({∃,@}O˜) = 1− pitrust.
The factor pdm(Oi) compares the position of an object
to the expected road boundaries. Let dm be a digital
grid map with binary values corresponding to road (1),
and non-road (0) squares. For each object, the metric
D(xi, dm) then calculates the Euclidean distance from the
measured position xi to the closest road square. As a
normalization factor we use a typical lane width [30] of
Wlane = 3.5m,
pdm(Oi) = e−D(x
i,dm)/Wlane . (10)
Finally, we have the signal value factor pval which com-
pares object attributes against physically possible limits.
In particular, we check the vertical position relative to the
road, dimensions, and absolute velocity,
pval(Oi) = exp
− ∑
A∈{z,W,L,H,|v|}
[Ai, Amax]+/Amax
 .
(11)
Here we denote [A,B]+ = θ(A−B)(A−B) as the positive
real difference, where θ(. . .) is the Heaviside function. The
predefined maximum limit of an attribute A is represented
by Amax, and we choose an empirically parameter set of
zmax = 3m, Wmax = 5m, Lmax = 25m, Hmax = 5m, and
|v|max = 80m/s.
D. Redundancy checks
To obtain an overall notion of plausibility of O˜, the
belief masses of the individual sensors referring to the same
system object are fused – note ⊕ – with the help of the
DS combination rule [26]. Assuming a total number of N
sensors, we arrive at the fused belief masses mF ,
mF (XO˜) ≡ [m1 ⊕m2 ⊕ . . .⊕mN ](XO˜). (12)
Iterating through all sources, any sensor that makes
a local observation of O˜ can possibly generate non-zero
belief masses for all propositions X ∈ ΘDS\∅. We register
unexpected observations when a reported object is outside
the non-occluded FoV of the reporting sensor, and at the
same time is non-coasting. These situations will produce
a high belief in the proposition mi({∃,@}O˜) ' 1. If a
given sensor i′ has no local representation in the respective
cluster, it matters whether it failed or was unable to
perceive the object. Therefore, we check if O˜ (as given
by the available reports of other sensors) is in the non-
occluded field of view of sensor i′, in which case we register
a miss for i′, along with the mass mi′(∃O˜) = 0 (see Sec.
III-C). Further, a miss is as well registered (without change
of the masses) for a sensor that fails to update an object
in its non-occluded FoV, as can be inferred from a positive
coasting status. Finally, if i′ has no representation but O˜ is
outside its FoV or occluded, i′ is an irrelevant contributor,
and we have mi′({∃,@}O˜) = 1. Such sensors do not have
any impact under the DS combination rule. Unexpected
observations and misses will be used for a statistical fault
analysis (see Sec. IV).
E. Collaborative model-based checks
We describe two additional, sensor-generic checks that
help to verify the integrity of high-level perception data
based on collaborative knowledge. More complex or
sensor-specific model-based checks – e.g. related to object
classes or trajectories – can be incorporated the same way,
and are envisioned for further research.
6Plausible observation history. We check whether
an increase of belief in the object existence across two
subsequent time steps is justified. This is not the case if
there is no current observation update obtained from any
sensor (i.e. if a system object has global coasting status
cst = 1). The existence probability and uncertainty of a
coasting object then have to be corrected appropriately,
with the belief increment ∆hist being transferred to the
ignorance hypothesis,
∆hist,∃(O˜(t)) = −
[
mF (∃O˜(t)),mF (∃O˜(t− 1))
]
+ × cst(t),
∆hist,@(O˜(t)) = 0,
∆hist,{∃,@}(O˜(t)) = −∆hist,∃(O˜(t)).
(13)
This check will prevent objects that have already left the
field of view, or spoofed objects with an alleged coasting
status to become more relevant.
Dimension-velocity check. The type of an object
is related to its physical speed limitations. Let us here
distinguish the two classes of vulnerable road users (VRU,
i.e. pedestrians, bicycles, etc.), and other objects (vehicles,
trucks, etc.). Since not all sensor modalities can reliably
identify object classes, we use the object dimensions for
a basic type estimate: VRUs are characterized by the
combination of small width and length extensions, and
low speed, as parametrized here by the empirical upper
thresholds lvru = 2m and vvru = 20m/s. Small and fast
objects will be considered implausible as a consequence,
and full ignorance is assumed (θ is the multi-dimensional
Heaviside function),
∆dim-vel,∃(O˜) = −mF (∃O˜) θ(lvru −W, lvru − L, |v| − vvru),
∆dim-vel,@(O˜) = 0,
∆dim-vel,{∃,@}(O˜) = −∆dim-vel,∃(O˜).
(14)
Note that object occlusions can temporarily reduce the
effectively observed object dimensions, and lead to a low-
plausibility assessment in Eq. 14. However, we expect this
effect to be short-lived and statistically uniform across
all sensors of the network, such that no individual fault
patterns will emerge due to this check.
Final combined metric. The corrections from all
model-based checks are combined as
mF (O˜)→
[
mF (O˜) +∆hist(O˜) +∆dim-vel(O˜)
]1
0 , (15)
with mF (O˜) = (mF (∃O˜),mF (@O˜),mF ({∃,@}O˜)) and
∆(O˜) = (∆∃(O˜),∆@(O˜),∆{∃,@}(O˜)). In case the accumu-
lated increments exceed the correct belief mass interval
bounds, we reestablish them by the mapping [. . .]10 apply-
ing subsequent shift and renormalization operations. The
DS framework defines the quantities of overall belief and
plausibility [26], however, we here work instead with the
related object existence probability p∃, and belief interval
s∃, which can be retrieved from the fused belief masses by
the pignistic transformation [28]p∃(O˜)
s∃(O˜)
 =
1 12
0 12

 mF (∃O˜)
mF ({∃,@}O˜)
 . (16)
With p∃, a Bayesian-like probability of the existence of
O˜ from all observed evidence is recovered. On the other
hand, s∃ can be interpreted as an epistemic uncertainty
measure, since it is directly proportional to the weight of
the ignorance proposition mF ({∃,@}O˜).
IV. Fault analysis
A. Addressed faults
For the roadside sensor network at hand, a service fail-
ure occurs if the system does not deliver data of sufficient
information quality to safely support AVs on the road.
This can happen in the form of various failure modes,
commonly categorizing failures from the view points of
domain, detectability, consistency, and consequences on
the environment [6]. We here focus on system failures that
can not be detected easily with component monitoring, but
leave statistical signatures to be studied in the plausibility
metrics. Therefore, our addressed failure mode is erratic
(data delivery does not halt but is silently corrupted, or
mistimed), unsignaled, systematic, and catastrophic (data
corruption can be safety-critical). Importantly, in this arti-
cle, we adopt a single fault hypothesis. This is justified by
the assumption that our analysis, possibly in combination
with additional sensor diagnostics, allows for a quick fault
detection, that renders the occurrence of multiple faults
in that very time interval unlikely. Perception faults that
were found to be relevant in roadside sensing experiments
and testbeds, and that all manifest in the above failure
mode, were listed in Tab. I. The highlighted items there
are chosen for further simulation studies in the following
section, to investigate their respective fingerprints in the
plausibility metrics. Our analysis will however be repre-
sentative of a wider spectrum of faults that belong to the
same class, and thus manifest themselves in a similar form.
B. Statistical evaluation
Systematic faults as the ones given in Tab. I alter sensor
readings over the course of many sensing cycles, such that
we expect statistically relevant deviations from a baseline
scenario. The goal of the fault evaluation process is to
identify: i) which of the sensors is faulty (assuming single
failures), and ii) what fault or fault class is present. To
that end, we inject the selected faults in separate setups,
and consider three characteristics for a statistical interpre-
tation: The miss ratio (MR) per sensor, the unexpected
observation rate (UOR) per sensor, and most importantly
the probability of existence of an object (involving all
sensors, see Eq. 16), here in relation to the observed
7Figure 3: Scenario of a four-lane highway segment monitored by a network of Radar sensors. An existence estimate is assigned
to each observed object. Sensor indices are shown in red color.
position in the monitored region. For the former two, we
define for a given time and a given sensor,
MR = missesmisses + all observations ,
UOR = unexpected observationsall observations .
(17)
The above metrics are evaluated at each time step,
however, it is important to note that the corresponding
variables are not independent due to the nature of the
underlying object tracking. For example, an object with a
low track score causing a low plausibility at a given time
step will likely have a low plausibility in the next time
step as well, since the track score only changes gradually.
To make the quantities quasi-iid variables, either of the
two following steps can be applied: i) The setup is run
various times with independent random distributions of
the objects, where the respective signatures are averaged
out across one individual scenario. ii) One long scenario
run is split into quasi-independent time intervals, where
each interval is long enough such that the scene changes
significantly from one interval to another. The plausibility
metrics within one time interval are averaged out, and the
statistics is performed over the resulting iid interval means,
assuming a normal distribution. The data basis for our
fault analysis is therefore the averages and errors of the
various interval means. Using standard methods [31], every
data point is presented with its 95% confidence interval
(CI) in the figures of Sec. V, and a fault is diagnosed if
the CI of a interval mean does not overlap with the CI
of the baseline scenario (no injected fault). For MR and
UOR, a statistical baseline without faults is established
by performing an additional cross-sensor weighted-least-
squares average.
In the following section, we analyze three selected fault
mechanisms in two different smart infrastructure scenar-
ios motivated by real experiments. The first setup is a
highway segment monitored by a network of overlapping
Radar sensors, where various vehicle types move on very
structured trajectories on multiple lanes. Objects moving
in parallel on different lanes occlude each other frequently.
In the second setting, we explore an urban intersection
monitored by two Lidar sensors with high accuracy. This
setup includes not only various vehicle types but also
cyclists and pedestrians, that all accelerate, stop, and take
turns. Each temporal interval in our simulations has a
sample rate of 0.1s and a duration of 5s, which we found
to be a sufficient duration for the highly dynamic scene to
change significantly.
V. Results
A. Scenario 1: Radar highway infrastructure
This scenario of highway surveillance by a network of
Radar sensors is guided by long-term observations within
the KoRA9 project [7], [15]. In our setup, a four-lane road
segment of about 600m is monitored by 12 Radars at a
separation of 50m, where we discard the first and last
sensor for the statistics to minimize finite size effects, see
Fig. 3. The simulation is done in Matlab® [32] using the
radarDetectionGenerator class and decentralized MOT
with extended Kalman filters (EKF). Key characteristics
are fov = (90m, 30◦, 8◦), detection probability pd = 0.9,
false alarm rate of pfa = 10−6, and a track confirmation
threshold [25] of Λcnf = 1.5 log(pd/pfa). To reflect experi-
ences with realistic Radar signal behavior, we implement
an additional signal generation up to a range of 100m,
with a reduced likelihood, which results in unexpected
observations. The adopted highway traffic model features
various vehicle classes such as cars, trucks, buses, and
generates speed, lane, and type distributions based on
realistic highway statistics [33]. Vehicle maneuvers such
as overtaking are neglected here since they do not impact
the observation quality significantly, see also [7].
Fig. 4 illustrates the plausibility signatures of an in-
jected miscalibration fault at one of the central sensors
(here sensor number 5 located at x = 200m, see Fig. 3),
representing fault class 1 in Tab. I. The affected Radar
is misoriented counter-clockwise by an azimuthal distur-
bance angle ∆φ. All objects observed by the affected sensor
then appear rotated (in the opposite direction) to the
fusion module, which is not aware of the altered sensor
pose. As a result, object tracks do not run parallel to
the lanes anymore, and coast out of the road boundaries.
We find that the lane-averaged existence probability p∃
is significantly reduced in a locally confined region of
200m . x . 300m, which clearly indicates a depend-
ability issue of nearby sensors (see Fig. 4). The deviation
appears on top of undulations in p∃ caused by the varying
distance of a passing objects to the respective closest
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Figure 4: Plausibility signatures of the highway scenario of Fig. 3 with injected azimuthal misorientation fault (at sensor 5). Due
to the rotated track headings, already small variations ∆φ of a few degrees lead to a characteristic fingerprint in all considered
metrics MR, UOR, and p∃.
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Figure 5: Plausibility signatures of the highway scenario with injected tracking parametrization fault (reduced track confirmation
threshold Λcnf at sensor 5). This fault can be identified from the locally reduced average p∃ as well as the increased MR of the
neighboring sensors.
sensor, which can be observed also in the absence of
faults. The inconsistencies of observations made by the
faulty sensor with its neighbor sensors leaves a trace in
the misses and unexpected object statistics as well: The
MR of sensor 5 is significantly increased, as this sensor
will no longer observe all targets close to the lower road
boundary, in contradiction to its neighbor sensor 6. At the
same time the UOR is reduced, which can be explained the
following way: The dominant contribution of unexpected
observations in our model comes from objects that are in
the sensing cone but beyond the regular sensing range. As
sensor 5 is misoriented counter-clockwise, this sensor field
segment is no longer covering the road, and thus no objects
are to appear there.
In the next scenario analyzed in Fig. 5 we simulate
a fault of class 2 (see Tab. I) by altering the tracking
parameters of the test sensor 5. While an appropriately
parametrized tracking system is quite robust against noise,
the tuning of track management parameters has a sig-
nificant impact on the false object observation rate. A
poor parametrization can be caused for example by human
intervention, software updates, or – if machine learning is
involved – by the deployment of non-optimal training sets
etc. Such faults seem a valid concern given that the use
of deep learning methods for MOT is a popular trend not
only for video applications [34]. To demonstrate tracking
errors we here modify the track confirmation threshold
Λcnf. When reduced with respect to its original value
Λcnf,0, tentative tracks are accepted after fewer matching
measurement updates, such that more false positive con-
firmed tracks are generated across the sensor’s FoV. As
a consequence, our simulation showcases that the MR of
the neighboring sensors 4 and 6 are significantly increased,
since those overlapping sensors can not confirm the large
number of false positive tracks generated by sensor 5. On
the other hand, this mismatch is effectively compensated
by the likewise increased number of overall observations
for sensor 5 itself. In the UOR statistics, no significant
fingerprint can be found since the false positive tracks
are mostly born in the regular FoV and thus will not
be registered as unexpected. Finally, the lane-averaged
p∃ again gives a clear indication of the locally confined
dependability issue. The dip in the projected existence
probability here follows a mexican hat potential, which
reflects the geometry of the sensor field overlaps.
B. Scenario 2: Urban intersection with Lidar
According to recent surveys [35], about 37% of fatal
vehicle crashes in the USA are intersection-related. Junc-
tions as critical hotspots will thus benefit in particular
from infrastructure assistance, and represent an interest-
ing use case for plausibility-related fault evaluation. In
this section, we study an urban intersection scenario that
is guided by the real infrastructure testbed in [36] (with
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Figure 6: Plausibility signatures derived from the two Lidar sensors covering the intersection shown in Fig. 7. The perception
of sensor 1 is impaired by a blind spot of azimuthal extension ωBS, inducing a high false negative rate.
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Figure 7:Overview of the CARLAmulti-lane intersection used
for the urban scenario. Two Lidar sensors are located on two
opposite corners of the junction, cocentric circles indicate the
point clouds generated by each Lidar. A blind spot fault with
tunable occlusion angle ωBS is injected at sensor 1.
the difference that Lidars are deployed instead of cameras
for ease of the simulation pipeline). The recordings were
performed in the open-source simulator for autonomous
driving research CARLA [37]. Based on the Unreal Engine
for the rendering, it provides with a set of towns and maps
in addition to various sensor models such as RGB cameras,
depth sensors, and Lidar sensors. For this scenario, a four-
way intersection of the Town03 map that resembles the
setup in [36] was chosen, see Fig. 7. Multiple lanes at each
intersection leg, and a large variety of randomly spawned
vehicles allow for a diverse urban traffic scenario featuring
cars, trucks, cyclists as well as pedestrians roaming on the
sidewalks. The recorded scenario has an overall length of
370s, which is split into quasi-independent intervals of 5s
each, and on average 18 tracks are detected per frame.
At this intersection, two Lidar sensors are placed at two
opposing corners, with a fov = (80m, 360◦, 28◦) that allows
to monitor all events taking place at the junction. This
layout represents a minimal example setup for accurate
object detection, under mitigation of occlusion events.
Each 16-channel Lidar sensor provides with a cloud of
230400 points per second, at an update rate of 20Hz. The
point cloud feeds into a deep neural network performing
3D object detection with the PointPillars algorithm, see
Refs. [38], [39] for performance and accuracy benchmarks
on the KITTI data set. A separate study with synthetic
CARLA data was conducted to verify that PointPillars
achieves a mean average precision similar to KITTI on the
classes car, cyclist and pedestrian, both from a bird-eye-
view and a 3D perspective [40]. The generated object list
includes information about 3D dimension, position, and
heading. Subsequently, the extracted bounding boxes are
tracked with an EKF. CARLA further provides with an
autonomous agent behavior: Vehicles stay in their lanes,
follow traffic lights and take random turns at intersections
(whenever possible), drive at a predefined speed, and do
not perform any maneuvers such as overtaking. Another
limitation of the CARLA simulator is the fact that the
traffic lights at an intersection follow a round-robin sched-
ule, where only one road has a green light at a time. Even
though the traffic model in the simulator is simplistic,
there are enough actors to produce occlusions.
In Fig. 6, we see that the established baseline of the
averaged p∃ shows a unsteady behavior at the intersection
interfaces, even in the absence of injected faults. This
can partially be attributed to the fact that vehicles are
frequently turning and accelerating in this zones, which
poses severe challenges for the trackers. A class-3-fault
(see Tab. I) is now injected into the simulation, in the
form of a blind spot for sensor 1 that represents e.g. a
significant mud splash on the Lidar cover. Sensor 1 is now
blind to detections under certain azimuthal angles facing
the intersection center, where the extension of the blind
spot is controlled by the parameter ωBS, see Fig. 7. The
simulation results in Fig. 6 demonstrate that the observed
probability of existence is statistically reduced in the inner
junction, given a sufficiently drastic sensor pollution. At
the same time, the miss ratio of the affected sensor 1 is
increased due to the inconsistent observations with respect
to sensor 2. Note that this gives us a handle to identify the
faulty Lidar within the described plausibilization scheme,
in a busy urban environment, even though in this experi-
ment only two overlapping sensors were used.
VI. Summary and conclusion
This article investigated whether specific plausibility
metrics – in our model represented by sensor miss ra-
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tios, unexpected observation ratios, and the collabora-
tive existence probability derived from various plausibility
checks across the monitored region – can act as fault
indicators in complex decentralized perception systems.
For two realistic roadside infrastructure scenarios, we have
tested selected perception faults in simulation, and demon-
strated that the resulting statistical fingerprints in the
plausibility metrics allow for a conclusive fault detection
and evaluation. The injected faults were hereby identified
from experience with the real-world smart infrastructure
systems KoRA9 and P++. Tab. II summarizes the results
of this analysis.
Since the deployed plausibility checks are independent
of the input sensor modality, or the underlying perception
algorithms, our analysis can be used in particular to
verify the integrity of systems with black box behavior.
An extension with checks focused on machine learning-
based perception faults is envisioned for further research.
The plausibility signatures are the more pronounced the
more sensor overlap can be generated. With this work, we
therefore emphasize as well the importance of redundant,
independent sources of information for fault tolerant au-
tomated driving.
Fault Characteristic signatures
Misoriented sensor pose Reduced local p∃, increased
MR for affected sensor, reduced
UOR for affected sensor
Incorrect parametrization of al-
gorithmic component (tracker
threshold)
Reduced local p∃, increased MR
for other overlapping sensors
Sensor polluted Reduced local p∃, increased MR
for affected sensor
Table II:Overview of the simulation results obtained in Sec. V,
confer also with Tab. I. The three selected empirical perception
faults analyzed in the two smart infrastructure scenarios lead
to distinct fingerprints in the plausibility metrics.
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